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O. Maslyukivska and M. Sohail
European countries are introducing changes to their
legislation and institutions that enable infrastructure
procurement through public–private partnerships (PPPs).
The purpose of this paper is to survey the legislation and
institutions for infrastructure procurement through PPPs
across Europe. Procurement procedures have no defined
status in the regulatory framework of the European Union
(EU); as a consequence, each member state has developed
its own PPP legal and institutional framework. As such the
process of procurement varies widely between the
member states. The legislative frameworks for PPPs are
discussed with reference to central and eastern Europe.
This paper finds that effective legal, regulatory and
contractual conditions perform successfully when they are
based on and supported by the institutional framework of
a country. A majority of European countries have realised
this necessity and have developed various institutional
framework models accordingly. These models are defined
according to the degree of centralisation of PPP
institutions in a country’s overall state structure; the
models are: highly centralised (western newly independent
states); highly decentralised (France and Portugal); and
mixed centralised and decentralised (Ireland, the UK, Italy
and the Netherlands). The changing institutional
framework in new member states is described with
reference to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public services and infrastructure investment are essential to the
competitiveness of European economies; however, investment
varies according to the social and economic disparities between
countries. Trans-European transport networks (TEN-Ts) and
public services such as water and wastewater management, solid
waste and energy operation are among the areas most in need
of investment.1 Most local infrastructure rehabilitation and
construction in the region is carried out under contracts to local
or even international construction companies. Increasingly,
services such as solid waste collection, maintenance of green
areas, management of public lighting and water and sanitation
services are delivered by private providers, which are contracted
by local government units under competitive bidding
procedures. Furthermore, inefficiencies, lack of modern
operating and managerial techniques and limited access to
technologies encourage partnerships with those who do have
this expertise. This paper is concerned with procurement (the
process of buying the goods, works or services) of infrastructure
through public–private partnerships (PPPs).
A number of the new member states of the European Union (EU)
have additional investment requirements arising from their
transition towards new economic, social and political systems.
For example, many of the new member states have relied
historically on railways; hence their motorway networks require
considerable investment. The World Bank estimated the
infrastructure investment needs for the accession candidates to
be €65 billion from 2003 over the next 15 years.2 It cites Poland
as the country with the highest infrastructure investment needs
(€21.4 billion), followed by the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania and
Latvia, with some 70% of these investment requirements being
at municipal or regional levels of government.3 The private
sector has been called in to bridge the gap between the required
investments in infrastructure rehabilitation/expansion and the
available internal and external funding.
Investors are usually attracted to countries that have a stable
and transparent regulatory framework, one that supports fair
competition and establishes the rights and duties of the parties.
In the case of PPPs, investors will be looking for a bankable
project and a regulatory climate that will protect them against
the perceived risks of doing business in the region. The
development of a sustainable regulatory PPP framework would,
from the other side, protect public authorities from the risk of
losing control over strategically significant spheres of work,
and would provide guarantees to the general public—the
consumers of services and products. Drafting and enforcement
of such legislation is on the agendas of the European
countries.
In order to cover these needs, as well as to ensure that
development strategies are executed effectively, the legislative
and institutional framework for PPPs across the region must
evolve further. This paper discusses the changes that are being
introduced to legislation at local, regional and European levels,
and surveys the institutions supporting the promotion of PPPs
that are being established.
2. METHODOLOGY
The paper is based on the findings of two studies conducted
between 1 April and 30 June 2003 on private sector
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participation (PSP) in central and eastern Europe and central
Asia (ECA) and between August and December 2005. The
methodology of the study consisted of the following two
activities.
(a) A desk study used for investigating the status and trends of
PSP in the region. Altogether more then 90 documents were
studied and analysed.
(b) Fieldwork was conducted to provide a detailed analysis of
the four focus countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary and Poland); a contact database was created with
over 50 entries. The database identified the key players of
the regulating bodies, private operators, professional
associations and unions, journalists, researchers and non-
governmental organisations.
3. PROCUREMENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS
This section focuses on the successes and failures in developing
PPP-related legislation in EU member states and the transition
countries in central and eastern Europe (namely the western
Balkan sub-region, western newly independent states, Caucasus
sub-region countries and central Europe). There is a need for
radical democratic and economic reforms in central and eastern
Europe in order to overcome the legacy of the central planning.
Where governance institutions and democratic trends remain
weak, so does the ability to operate a business in a legal and
ethical environment. The purpose of focusing on central and
eastern European countries is to highlight the disparity in
legislation between those countries that have achieved or are
moving towards EU accession, and those that may not achieve
membership in the foreseeable future.
Public procurement laws have been drafted and implemented in
recent years in all countries across the region. Legislation is
required to introduce the main procurement rules, such as: the
responsibility of the procuring entity (the municipality, for
example) to implement and manage procurements for goods,
works and services; the role of the approving and authorising
officers to sign the procurement contracts; and other rules
ensuring transparency, efficiency and preventing conflict of
interest. The procurement methods usually stipulated are:
competitive shopping; competitive tendering; restricted
tendering; two-stage competitive tendering; public procurement
methods for consultancy services; direct single source method;
and emergency procurement. Provisions on conflict of interest
and corruption are also generally included.
The EU is unique among international organisations in having a
complex and highly developed system of internal law that has a
direct effect within the legal systems of its member states. In
contrast to nations such as the United States of America,
European nations subscribe to the principle that international
law adopted by a nation overrides national law, and hence it is
the case that EU law overrides the national laws of its member
states.
The resolution following the Green Paper and the public
discussions
opposes the creation of a separate legal regime for PPPs but considers
that there is a need for legislative initiatives in the areas of concessions,
respecting the principles of the internal market and threshold values
and providing simple rules for tendering procedures, and for
clarification with regard to institutionalised public–private
partnerships.
However, any act whereby a public entity entrusts the provision
of economic activity to a third party must be examined against
the rules and principles of the EC Treaty, in particular the
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services
(articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty,4 respectively). These
principles also include transparency, equality of treatment,
proportionality and mutual recognition. The Commission
adopted on 15 November 2005 the communication on PPPs and
Community law on public procurement and concessions. This
communication presents policy options with a view to ensuring
effective competition for PPPs without unduly limiting the
flexibility needed to design innovative and often complex
projects.5
Table 1 outlines some of the major actions or initiatives that the
EU has taken in the area of PPPs and Table 2 illustrates the
recommendations for the EU PPP policy formulation.
The western Balkan sub-region includes five independent
states—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), and
Serbia and Montenegro (including the province of Kosovo and
Mitohija). Publicly available policies promoting or restricting
PPPs tend to be absent in the western Balkan countries, and this
impedes the effective application of any existing enabling
legislation, such as concession laws or public procurement laws.
In fact, public procurement laws have been drafted and
implemented in recent years in all the western Balkan countries.
Such laws have, however, received criticism for such issues as:
transparency and non-discrimination policies that are hard to
implement; procurement processes that lack objectivity; and in
general the presence of too many possibilities to shift to non-
competitive procedures. In general, commercial legislation in the
former Yugoslav republics is still based partly on laws inherited
from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, such
laws being largely irrelevant in a modern market economy.
Corruption is reputedly a serious problem in public procurement,
particularly in the western Balkan region, with frequent
allegations that contracts are awarded on the basis of personal
and political relationships between business persons and
government officials. The judicial system is also perceived to be
susceptible to external political and commercial influence to some
degree. At the same time, although legislation outlaws bribery and
some prosecutions of government officials for corruption have
taken place, enforcement of such legislation is uneven.
The (new) Public Procurement Law (PPL) in Kosovo6 provides
procedures modelled on existing European procedures and
introduces measures required by the relevant EU directives. The
new law also establishes new and reforms the old institutions to
manage the procurement system: the Public Procurement
Agency, the Public Procurement Regulatory Body and the Public
Procurement Rules Committee. The new PPL of 2004 represents
a big step towards aligning the relevant legal framework in
Kosovo more closely with EU requirements; however, the overall
weak and incomplete implementation of Kosovo’s procurement
legislation undermines the efficiency of the system. Procuring
entities (some 500 in total) have not received adequate support
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in the application of the PPL and the skills deficit in this area
remains very high.
With regard to public procurement legislation Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH), in the autumn of 2004 the Council of
Ministers agreed on the Law on Public Procurement. The
legislation is expected to ensure that fair and transparent
procedures are applied to all public purchases. As of 2005,
€300–400million euros were being spent annually on public
procurement at all administrative levels in BiH; the Law on
Public Procurement is meant to establish an efficient, effective
and modern legal framework to regulate such transactions. The
PPL provides for the establishment of two independent
organisations dealing with public procurement issues: the Public
Procurement Agency (article 48), reporting to the Council of
Ministers, and the Procurement Review Body (article 49),
reporting to parliament.
The four countries that make up the western newly independent
states (NIS)—Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and
Ukraine—face many challenges in the course of adapting the
PPP framework for public service delivery. The most vivid
Date Action Source
1993 White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment COM (93) 700
1997 High Level Group on PPP financing of TEN-T projects (Kinnock report) COM (97) 453
2000 Commission’s interpretative communication on concession under
community law
Official Journal of the European
Communities OJEC (2000/c 121/02)
2000 Proposal for a regulation of the Council and Parliament concerning the
granting of aid for the coordination of transport by rail, road and inland
waterways
COM (2000) 5
2001 White Paper on European transport policy for 2010: time to decide COM (2001) 370
2002 Building a valuable approach to PPPs. Working session on the draft guidelines COM (2001) 370
2003 Guidelines for successful public–private partnerships. DG regional policy and
dissemination at a series of international conferences
Director General Regional Policy
2003 A European initiative for growth: investing in networks and knowledge for
growth and jobs
COM (2003) 690 final
2003 Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and the Council amending
decision No. 1692/96/EC on community guidelines for the development of
the TEN-T
COM (2003) 564; adopted on 21 April
2004
2003 Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) no. 2236/95 laying down
general rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of TEN-T
Adopted on 30 March 2004; awaiting
publication in OJEC COM (2003) 561
2003 Developing TEN-T: innovative funding solutions and proposal for a directive
on the widespread introduction and interoperability of electronic toll
collection systems. Communication from the Commission
COM (2003) 132 final
2003 High level group report on the TEN-T networks (Van Miert report) DG Transport
2004 Eurostat proposal on accounting treatment of PPPs Committee for Monetary, Financial and
Balance of Payments statistics and
Eurostat news release (STAT/04/18),
February 2004
2004 New procurement directives, including introduction of competitive dialogue Adopted in February; awaiting
publication in OJEC
2004 Green Paper: EU consultative paper on PPPs and community law on public
contracts and concessions
COM (2004) 327 final, May 2004
2005 Report on the public consultation on the Green Paper on Public–Private
Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions
SEC(2005) 629
2006 European Parliament resolution on public–private partnerships and
Community law on public procurement and concessions
2006/2043(INI)
Sources: PricewaterhouseCoopers plc.;3 EU initiative on public–private partnerships and Community law on public procurement and concessions.5
Table 1. Major EU actions and initiatives in area of PPPs
(a) To improve understanding of PPPs in the EU institutions, the Commission should set up a cross-EU PPP Group, supported by a small
central unit, to coordinate activities affecting PPPs and assess the impacts which EU actions have on their development.
(b) The EU should address the poor level of public sector institutional capacity and knowledge about PPPs in many member states by
funding several initiatives, including studies on the actual benefits PPPs can deliver, the provision of training and the secondment of
private sector specialists and civil servants to, and between, the PPP units of member states.
(c) The EU should clarify the way that its directives, regulations and legislation interact with PPP procurements although, since PPPs are
hard to define and vary greatly across Europe, a legislative approach from the Commission is neither practical nor desirable.
(d) As the EU is open to private finance being used as a form of co-financing, it should assist member states to address the challenging
issues involved in combining EU funding with private sector finance and PPPs, helping member states to implement pilot projects, from
which practical guidelines can be produced.
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers plc.3
Table 2. Summary of recommendations for EU PPP policy formulation
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challenge is the lack of an investment climate that would attract
private companies into the public service delivery sector. The
investment climate in Belarus is one of the most challenging in
the NIS. The country has a highly centralised system of
economic management, state intervention, a privatisation
programme that has for the most part come to a halt and a
banking system that is controlled primarily by central
government. This situation has led to the private sector playing
an insignificant role in public service delivery in Belarus, while
those enterprises that do exist operate under the close control of
central government bodies. A significant trend in the Russian
Federation has been the growing role of the domestic private
sector in public services provision in recent years. Among other
things, this has highlighted the shortcomings of the country’s
existing legal and institutional arrangements, and has prompted
the Russian government to launch a major programme of
legislative reform. Local governments, in particular, face major
challenges when negotiating contracts with private operators.
In Moldova the obstacles to private sector involvement in the
provision of public services include contradictory laws and
legislation which is poorly supported and implemented, so
undermining the usefulness of—and investor confidence in—
specific laws. Despite laws on procurement and concessions that
correspond quite closely to international standards, there is a
wide gap between the law as written and its implementation in
Moldova. Moldova’s current Law on Procurement of Goods,
Works and Services for Public Needs (No. 1166-XII, 30 April
1997) is based largely on the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model and provides a
reasonably sound basis for public procurement. It was prepared
with assistance from an international legal consultant and
financed by an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant from
the World Bank. The law contains a number of weaknesses, which
have the effect of reducing transparency in the conduct of public
procurement. Foremost among these are the items listed here.
(a) Bid evaluation methodologies that are based on subjective,
merit point-based systems, rather than on objective criteria.
(b) Limited provisions on the procurement of consultants’
services.
(c) Inadequate arrangements for the review of bid protests. An
administrative review of bidders’ appeals is undertaken by
the National Agency for Government Procurement (NAGP).
Given the close involvement of the NAGP in the execution
of public procurement, including both its conduct of
procurement procedures and approval of award decisions,
the ability of the NAGP to act independently in reviewing
bidders’ appeals is clearly open to question.
Since its adoption the application of the public procurement law
has been undermined by the absence of a comprehensive set of
implementing regulations.
Although PPPs are possible via lease or concession arrangements,
legislation in the Ukraine prohibits the sale of networks and
equipment used in the provision of public services to private
investors. This means that it is not possible to constitute a joint
venture between a municipality and a private firm to provide
public services. Frequent changes to legislation act as a further
hindrance to business. While modification of the legal framework
inherited from the command (socialist) economy is a normal
process of transition, numerous changes to regulations preclude
entrepreneurs and politicians from developing long-term
strategies. Legislative instability also sets the stage for inconsistent
and inaccurate interpretation of regulations and legal acts, and
this in turn feeds corruption. Many entrepreneurs, for example,
believe that Ukrainian agency officials are often unpredictable in
interpreting legislation. This then prompts entrepreneurs to resort
to unofficial payments to tip decisions in their favour.
Dozens of laws, normative acts, and executive orders addressing
decentralisation have been passed in each of the Caucasus
sub-region countries over the past decade. Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia have designed projects aimed at improving local
governance for implementation with the help of international
and Western organisations. The countries continue to pursue
efforts to conform to European and international legislative
standards. Despite such progress in legislative and executive
development, there remain three factors that considerably
impede the expansion of local government institutions.
(a) The legislative base remains underdeveloped. Several
important laws have not yet been adopted, allowing the
existing legal framework to remain largely insufficient.
(b) Existing laws are often contradictory. These require
revision, as there are manifold inconsistencies among laws,
and even among separate clauses of the same law.
(c) There is a lack of legal discipline. Many laws do not work
in practice, due to large-scale corruption in governmental
structures, flaws in legislation, and extremely low levels of
administrative professionalism.
The Law of Georgia ‘On the Procedure for Granting Concessions
to Foreign Countries and Companies’ was adopted in 1994 and
amended in 1996 (the ‘Concession Law’). The law applies to
foreigners only, thus discriminating against domestic investors
and excluding these from concession arrangements. The
Concession Law defines concession as a ‘leasing agreement’ for
the purpose of foreign investment. The Law seems to limit its
scope of application to natural resources and activities related
thereto. It contains a vague reference to ‘an authorised body as
defined under legislation of Georgia’, as the public authority to
grant concessions. There are numerous deficiencies in the law; for
example the selection procedure is not defined in the Concession
Law, nor is the disputes settlement procedure. The Concession
Law, however, contains a number of positive elements: the
concessionaire’s right to appeal to the court or arbitration court
‘against public organs for their abuse of power’ and provision of
certain forms of government support/guarantees.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Assessment of Concession Laws undertaken to evaluate the
status of laws throughout the EBRD’s 27 countries of operations
ranked the concession laws in Georgia as in very low
compliance with international standards. The law is one of the
weakest in the region and is regarded as an early (and outdated)
attempt to govern concession arrangements at the start of
reforms. Ten years after its enactment, the Concession Law is
expected to be fully revised in order to facilitate private sector
participation in infrastructure, public utilities and services to
match the needs of a modern economy.
The central Europe region is represented by a number of new
member states and countries that are going to join the EU in
future accession rounds. For instance, Bulgaria and Romania
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joined in 2007. Romania has developed legislation to entrust the
private sector with public assets management through rental,
concessions and other forms of public–private partnership. A
specific PPP law defines 5 types of contracts (build—operate–
transfer, design—build–operate, build–operate-renewal, leasing—
development–operate, and refurbish—operate–transfer). Bulgaria
has weak PPP legislation, yet private sector involvement is more
advanced than in other countries in the region. Some of the PPP
forms between municipalities and private companies in Bulgaria
include: contracting; the establishment of joint venture or
shareholding companies; concession on municipal property or
the right to use and/or build on such property; the sale of
municipal property under certain conditions; concessions on
building rights; and use of municipal property in order to carry
out maintenance. Turkey started membership talks in the
autumn of 2005. In 1994 the Turkish government made
amendments to the constitution and embarked upon structural
reforms of its key public sector services. None of these countries
had a specific PPP unit, although there are discussions about
the need for such units. Institutions that deal with privatisations
(the privatisation administration in Turkey) and specific
ministries (the water and environmental protection ministry in
Romania) currently tackle PPP-related questions.
The Croatian Law Center (CLC) was established in 1994 with the
support of the Open Society Institute—Croatia. The main goal of
the CLC is to promote the rule of law in Croatia through such
means as establishing legal principles that are in accordance
with international standards, advancing professionalism in the
judiciary and supporting general legal research. The CLC is
working on revising legislation that will initiate local
self-government reforms. The various components of the CLC’s
activities are
(a) decentralisation of public administration
(b) fighting corruption
(c) access to justice
(d ) protection and development of human rights.
A survey of existing procurement law in central and eastern
Europe suggests that such laws appear to have several weaknesses.
(a) Across the region, some frameworks adhere in part to
international standards and to good practice in public
procurement whereas other laws are more rigid, costly,
time-consuming and bureaucratic than the EU regime and
also less flexible.
(b) In certain cases, inadequate respect for the rule of law does
not allow for adequate and fair enforcement of enacted
rules. This has resulted in corruption at the local level.
(c) Legal discrepancies, a lack of objectivity and the lack of
appropriate systems, procedures and mechanisms have
fostered abuses of power.
(d ) Overlapping functions and responsibilities of different levels
of government, the absence of real decision-making powers,
and the lack of financial resources (due to deficiencies in
intergovernmental fiscal relations) have further reduced the
effectiveness of legal frameworks for PPPs.
4. MODELS OF PROCUREMENT—INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORKS
Effective legal, regulatory and contractual conditions are
crucial for the success of procurement, but such conditions can
only perform successfully when they are based on and
supported by a country’s institutional framework. This
institutional structure should aim at both facilitating
procurement and providing clear boundaries to protect the
interests of all stakeholders.7 The institutional framework is
crucial if the public sector is to change its role from that of a
single provider of services to fulfilling the duties of an
independent regulator and manager.
Three approaches to intervention are usually defined,8
depending on the degree of centralisation of PPP institutions in
a country’s overall state structure
(a) highly centralised (e.g. western newly independent states)
(b) highly decentralised (e.g. France and Portugal)
(c) mixed centralised and decentralised (e.g. Ireland, the UK,
Italy and the Netherlands).
The western NIS’s institutional framework for PPP facilitation is
among the most centralised. For example there is no specific
PPP-related institution in Belarus or the Republic of Moldova to
support the delivery of public services. Different ministries and
agencies are responsible for provision of particular services
through PPPs, often duplicating each other’s functions.
A highly decentralised model has been developed in Portugal
and France. Within this model, governments have not
established any specific institutions to facilitate or coordinate
delivery on numerous initial projects in both the roads and
water sectors. PPPs are, however, becoming an important
element of municipal planning in France and Portugal, thus the
management of projects has very much been left to individual
government departments and local authorities. ‘Informal task
forces’ have been established, however, in order to advise on
possible PPP forms, legal barriers and institutional structures.8
In France, the decentralised approach places the responsibility at
the regional level and within the ministries concerned.7
Spain is similar to France, with decentralised governance
established at the state level; this moves the possible PPP
institutional and legislative developments to the city or regional
level.9 With more and more cases of PPPs and a growing
realisation of the need for regulation, some form of central
coordination may well develop in the decentralised PPP
countries mentioned here, as has been the case in most other
countries to date.
The UK, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands have selected a more
centralised approach by creating one dedicated national PPP
unit. In the indicated range of centralisation, these examples
may be referred to as a mixed (centralised and decentralised)
model. In the majority of cases, centralisation is reflected in the
creation of a separate PPP unit in the country within a certain
ministry with joint public and private participation. At the same
time, there is a degree of decentralisation to this approach,
because separate units do not implement the projects
(implementation is still the responsibility of the relevant
department, agency or local authority).
In the Netherlands, a PPP Knowledge Centre has been
established within the Ministry of Finance, staffed by
representatives of the private sector and the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Affairs (Ref. 10, footnote 20). The main
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responsibilities of the unit are the dissemination of PPP
knowledge and best practice, as well as promoting the use of
PPPs.
In Italy, a temporary government body has been established
within the Economic Policy Committee, with joint
representation of the Ministry of Public Works, Finance,
Treasury and the private sector. The closely defined functions of
the unit include encouraging private sector involvement,
addressing deficiencies in the current legislative framework,
advising contracting authorities on taking projects forward and
the promotion of PPPs.
The Irish PPP institutional
framework was developed
using, to a great extent, that
of the United Kingdom as an
example. A central PPP unit,
based in the Department of
Finance, has been established
as part of the Irish model. The
unit does not deliver projects
and, apart from providing best
practice guidance, has a
limited role in project support.
The aims of the unit are,
rather, to manage the PPP
programme, national market
development, national
stakeholder engagement and
national policy development in
the area of PPPs.10 The
Interdepartmental Group (IDG)
on PPPs is the key public
sector forum of the
institutional structures
established by Government to
manage the development of
PPPs in Ireland. The main task
of the IDG is to ensure
consistency in the
implementation of Ireland’s
PPP programme across the
public service and to develop
issues cutting across all the
sectors involved in the PPP
programme.
The model developed in the
UK has evolved enormously
since 1994 up until recently.
During the early 1990s, a
central body, The Private
Finance Panel Executive, was
established to develop policy
and best practice, but with
limited project delivery or
support functions. The Labour
government replaced that
body with the Treasury
Taskforce, which was located
within the Treasury. Being
staffed with civil servants and private sector experts, this body
had both policy development and project support roles. In 1999
HM Treasury transformed the Taskforce, with responsibility for
policy development being assigned to the new Office for
Government Commerce and the project support role to the new
Partnerships UK, a joint venture company established by the
Treasury and a number of private companies holding a majority
stake (Ref. 10, footnote 25).
In all the above listed cases, policymakers within the countries
have realised the importance of placing experts within units to
Country PPP unit PPP law Relative PPP experience
(water and wastewater sector)
Member states
Austria T T T – g
Belgium T h h g g
Denmark T T – –
Finland – h g
France T h h –
Germany T T h h g g g g
Greece T h h –
Ireland T T T h h h g g g g
Italy T T h g g
Luxembourg – – –
The Netherlands T T T – g g g
Norway (not EU) T – –
Portugal T T h h g g g
Spain – h h g g g
Sweden – – –
UK T T T – g g g g g
New member states
Cyprus – – g g
Czech Republic T T h h g g g
Estonia T – –
Hungary T T h g g g
Latvia T T h –
Lithuania – – –
Malta T – –
Poland T T h h g g g
Slovakia – – g
Slovenia – – g g g
Bulgaria T h g g g
Romania T h h g g g
Applicant countries
Turkey – h h h g g g
Balkans
Albania – – –
Bosnia and Herzegovina – – g
Croatia – – g g
Kosovo – – g
Macedonia – – –
Serbia and Montenegro – – –
– Information is not available
T Need for PPP unit identified and some actions taken (or only a regional unit available)
T T PPP unit in progress (or existing, but in a purely consultative capacity)
T T T PPP unit existing (and actively involved in PPP promotion)
h Legislation being proposed
h h Comprehensive legislation being drafted/some sector-specific legislation in place
h h h Comprehensive legislation in place
g Discussions ongoing
g g Projects in procurement
g g g Many procured projects, some projects closed
g g g g Substantial number of closed projects
g g g g g Substantial number of closed projects, but a number of them in operation
Source: Adapted from PricewaterhouseCoopers plc.3
Table 3. PPP institutional development
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guide and manage the PPP process. In the beginning, such PPP
units focused particularly on developing capability, the required
legal and regulatory structures, market interests and pilot
projects in order to test the value of PPPs. However, with time
the focus has shifted towards assisting the selection of PPP
opportunities, counselling and advice, ensuring value for
money, attracting investors and above all maintaining political
support and the trust of stakeholders (Ref. 10, footnote 21).
Table 3 evaluates the degree of institutional and legislative
progress in the area of PPPs in the EU and accession countries.
This figure provides a relative assessment of PPP legislative
development and actual PPP progress in focus countries. This
conclusion is, however, based on a trend, not precise data and
thus should be considered as the observation results.
5. COMPARISON OF NEW EU MEMBER STATES
From the legislative point of view, all EU member states have to
comply with the aquis communitaire—basic directives, the EU
Treaty and other legislation regulating the functioning of the EU.
PPP procurement procedures, however, have no defined status in
the regulatory framework of the EU; as a consequence, each
member state, including the new member states, has to develop its
own PPP legal and institutional framework. In new member
states, this enhancement has been influenced greatly by the EU’s
financial aid requirements, existing legislative and institutional
traditions. The examples of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland are provided below for comparison. Poland, Hungary, and
Czech Republic are first-tier EU accession countries. These
countries have undergone a significant reform of the sector. There
are also inflows of capital available from domestic and foreign
sources due to the countries’ macroeconomic performance,
availability of accession funds, efficiency of the utilities
concerned and the countries’ regulatory and policy environments.
The main challenge for these countries is to continue
improvements in their institutions and to mobilise the enormous
resources needed to meet stringent EU standards. The market is
also quite attractive to PPP because of political stability, stable
currencies and skilled workforces.11 However, support is still being
provided by international financial institutions to the water
sectors for capital renovation and expansion in the form of grants
and soft loans; this is because of the lack of investment
commitment to infrastructure from the private operators.
5.1. The Czech Republic
New rules for PPP projects involving construction works or
infrastructure and other services came into force in March 2006:
the Law on Public Contracts and the Law on Concession
Contracts and Concession Procedures were adopted. The Public
Contracts Law establishes the central purchasing body. The first
application of the new rules is the transport projects that are
already approved by the Government as PPP pilot projects. The
PPP concession contracts involve the following conditions.
(a) The concessionaire agreeing to provide services and/or
construction works.
(b) The public authority agreeing to let the concessionaire
benefit from those services or works.
(c) The concessionaire bearing a substantial part of any risks
involved in that benefit.
(d ) The concessionaire being able to receive payments from the
public authority.
With these two laws the Czech government took a more
programmed and systematic approach to PPPs. Changes to
legislation specifically concern particular tasks such as
procurement, concessions, and other fields of legislation. The
Czech government has also looked at the institutional set-up
(Table 4).
Existing PPP projects in the Czech Republic include waste
management, water supply projects, transportation systems
(construction and maintenance of roads and railways),
information technology, public lighting in Prague and education.
5.2. Hungary
PPP projects have gained significant importance over the past
few years in Hungary. In fact, some experts claim that Hungary
has the most mature PPP market in the region, although it has
historically been ambivalent. Given this basis, the Ministry of
Economy and Transport plans to review the current legislation
to assess whether changes to the existing legislation or the
introduction of a completely new law on PPPs would be
appropriate to improve the legal framework to facilitate the
implementation of PPP projects (Table 5).
The new Act CXXIX of 2003 on Public Procurement (PPA) does
not contain any special rules relating to the creation of PPPs.
Whether an agreement creating a PPP falls within the scope of
the PPA is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The
creation of a PPP is, however, usually based on an agreement
awarded through a public procurement procedure, as the subject
matter of the agreement is usually a works or service concession
and the value of the agreement typically exceeds the public
procurement thresholds. The procuring authority for a PPP
generally qualifies as a contracting authority for the purposes of
the PPA, as the PPA contains a rather broad definition of
contracting authority.
5.3. Poland
Before 2005 there was no special law for PPP projects in
Poland. The small number of common public and private
projects were realised under existing laws, which were mainly
the Public Procurement Act and the Civil Codex Act. Since
(a) Public Procurement Act (PPA)
(b) No specific PPP legislation, but amended existed legal base
(c) Law on Public Contracts
(d) Law on Concession Contracts and Concession Procedures
(e) Institutional set-up development is under way
Table 4. Summary of the PPP legal framework in the Czech
Republic
(a) Legal changes ongoing
(b) History of private involvement in roads
(c) 1991 Concessions Act
(d) Parliament needs to approve larger projects (that is, projects
larger than €95million)
(e) New Public Procurement Act regulates PPPs on a case-by-
case basis
(f ) PPP law is being considered
Table 5. Summary of the PPP legal framework in Hungary
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Poland joined the EU, the idea of preparing the legal framework
for the cooperation between public and private entities came
back with a new dynamic (Table 6).
The parliament adopted the Public Private Partnership Act in
July 2005. The act established the platform for realisation of
PPP projects. The Public Procurement Act (29 January 2004)
preceded the Act and three ordinances on PPP have been issued,
to deal with some of the practicalities of PPP projects
introduced by legislation last year.
(a) On the scope, rules and procedures for supplying
information to the Minister of Economy by the public body
entering into a PPP project.
(b) On risk allocation in PPP projects. The specific risks are to
be allocated in the most appropriate way, taking into
account each party’s abilities and experience in risk
management.
(c) On the scope of the feasibility studies for PPP projects. This
requires public bodies to conduct a wide range of studies to
show that using PPP for the project is in the public interest.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has provided a survey of the legislation and
institutions developed for infrastructure procurement through
PPPs across Europe. Underinvestment and an urgent need for
upgraded and expanded infrastructure pressurise the search for
alternatives to public sources of funding. Inefficiencies, lack of
modern operating and managerial techniques and limited access
to technologies encourage partnerships with the private sector
companies that have this expertise. In order to further
encourage the private sector to increase its involvement, sector
reform is required in order to put in place institutional and legal
frameworks. Thus, an enabling legal environment, which allows
different PPP options and clearly specifies the rules of play,
needs to be put in place before launching PPP. In fact, PSP is
only possible/useful to the degree that it is supported by the
local framework. Furthermore, if government is to change from
being a direct service provider to an independent manager,
monitor and regulator, the public sector needs to establish a
working institutional framework. All functions within this
framework need to be carried out with an in-depth
understanding of the motives of the private sector; in this way,
the balance between these motives and safeguarding public
interests can be achieved.
6.1. Recommendations
The research found that legislation should be more stable with
less frequent changes (e.g. western NIS countries and in
particular Ukraine). In most cases legislation still needs to be
developed to enable private sector participation in public service
delivery. A lack of everyday, institutional support for
contracting entities results in low-quality implementation of the
existing procurement law. The weak institutional framework
across the region requires special attention before PPPs can be
considered as a tool utilised on the national scale. Existing PPP
examples are mostly based on a case-by-case basis and often
are built upon personal connections and relations with the local
government authorities.
The research found that current obstacles to effective procurement
via legislative and institutional frameworks include the following.
(a) The legal frameworks are often highly complex, challenging
and in many situations inconsistent.
(b) The efficiency of the country’s procurement legislation is
also undermined by weakness in its law enforcement
mechanism.
(c) Administration, law enforcement and the judiciary
throughout the region are characterised by a lack of
impartiality, accountability and transparency.
(d ) Central government is still directly involved and plays a
crucial role in every large procurement procedure, for
example in Kosovo, yet often does not have sufficient
resources or capacities to carry out this task.
(e) Unclear demarcation of functions between local and central
government.
( f ) The lack of a transparent and predictable legal and
regulatory framework within which to establish and operate
a business impedes investment in the region. The relatively
poor (although improving) investment climate appears to be
the biggest impediment for PPP development.
Conditions that will ensure success usually include the
following conditions.
(a) Strong political support, particularly in creating and
managing suitable structures for policy development and
procurement.
(b) The establishment of a central public procurement
institution may improve the situation provided that the new
institution will be staffed and funded adequately and that
its professionalism will be safeguarded.
(c) The majority of models (the Irish experience, in particular)
emphasise the necessity of stakeholders’ cooperation if
procurement is to be effective.
(d ) The key role of separate (central) PPP units is to create
trust, in order to decrease risks and therefore costs, as well
as to develop open and sustainable partnerships.
The development of national PPP strategies may, however,
differ depending on various factors. These factors include: the
institutional capacity; regulatory changes; the state of the sector
before the transition from a planned to a market economy; the
extent of reforms undertaken so far; the macro-economic
performance of the countries concerned; levels of household
income; disparities between the member states; and the
availability of external assistance. Positive examples of PPP
legal and institutional base development in the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary can serve as an example for the rest of the
central and eastern Europe region.
This paper recommends that municipalities need greater
technical and legal capacity to negotiate contracts with private
companies. It is important to explain to the decision-makers the
(a) Draft PPP legislation under development
(b) Public Procurement Law
(c) Various road projects under development
(d) PPP is the big challenge for Poland
(e) No experiences with new PPP law
(f ) Good political climate
(g) Trust between the partners
(h) State aid available for PPP projects
Table 6. Summary of the PPP legal framework in Poland
166 Management, Procurement and Law 160 Issue MP4 European infrastructure procurement through PPP Maslyukivska . Sohail
consequences of, and parties’ responsibilities to, each type of
contractual agreement. If this is not feasible, advisory regulators
need to be established to consult with and advise municipalities
on partnerships with the private sector. There is a necessity to
strengthen the ‘public’ side of partnerships. There is a need for
capacity-building programmes on the part of public authorities,
as well as the need for further reforms of local administrations
and self-governments. Local authorities should be taught to bid
effectively and maintain the monitoring of projects on an
ongoing basis, keeping regular checks to ensure that the project
develops as agreed in the contract. Including members of the
general public in the process of monitoring/supervision may
ensure the sustainable success of procurement, ensuring trust
among all stakeholders.
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